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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Petition No.

v.
ROLAND W. REICHERT,
Defendant and Petitioner.

RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, in contravention of Rule 50, Rules of Utah
Supreme Court, has not confined himself to arguments first raised
in the brief in opposition to the petitionj for certiorari, but
has argued an issue that was never presented to the Utah Court of
Appeals, was not urged as a basis for granting the petition for
certiorari, and was not treated in respondent's opposing brief.
Accordingly, respondent tenders this supplemental brief dealing
only with the new issue raised in petitioner's reply.
FACTS
Based upon an affidavit of Ephraim H. Fankhauser, this
court

is

being

asked

to

consider

the

following

facts:

Petitioner's counsel, on or about April 6, 1990, became aware for
the first time that The Honorable Judith Billings, who wrote the
opinion for the Court of Appeals in this case was related by

marriage

to

Peter

Billings

and

Peter

Billings,

Jr.,

who

are

"partners at Fabian & Clendenin"; that counsel was surprised to
learn of this since Judge Billings did not mention it to him or
his client; and that petitioner was shocked and felt that he was
a victim of injustice based upon his perception of bias on the
part of Judge Billings.
Petitioner's statement of facts is erroneous in stating
that

Peter

Billings

Fabian & Clendenin.

and Peter

what

if

at

is a professional corporation without

The Fankhauser

knowledge,

are partners

As the pleadings throughout this case indi-

cate, Fabian & Clendenin
partners.

Billings, Jr.,

affidavit

any, Judge

contains

Billings

has

no
or

indication
had

about

of
the

financial interests of Peter Billings and Peter Billings, Jr. in
this lawsuit, or the manner in which the professional corporation
distributes

its

income.

A fact of which

this court may

take

notice is that Peter Billings has been associated with Fabian &
Clendenin for 40 years, and that Judge Billings's husband, Thomas
T.

Billings,

is a lawyer

in the competing

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.
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firm

of Van

Cott,

ARGUMENT
I.
Grounds for the Disqualification of Judge
Billings Have Not Been Shown
As a basis for contending that Jfudge Billings should
have disqualified
relies

upon

herself

78-7-1,

from hearing
Utah

Code

this case, petitioner

Annotated,

3(C)(1)(d)(iii) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

and

Canon

Neither of

these authorities, however, require disqualification of Judge
Billings.
The code provision, 78-7-1, reads as follows:
Except by consent of all parties, no justice,
judge or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such
in any action or proceeding:
(1) in which he is a patty, or in which he is
interested.
(2) when he is related to either party by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree,
computed according to the rules of the common law.
(3) when he has been attorney or counsel for
either party in the action or proceeding. * * *
Neither Peter Billings nor Peter Billings, Jr., is a
party to this proceeding, and neither has lqeen attorney or counsel for either party in the action or proceeding.
The provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct is somewhat different, though similar.

It reads, in part, as follows:

- 3-

(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably
be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
*

*

*

(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within
the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii)
proceeding;

is

acting

as

a

lawyer

in

the

(iii) is known by the judge to have an
interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely
to be a material witness in the proceeding;
The cited canon is based on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, as amended.

The ABA commentary to (d)(ii)

reads as follows:
Commentary: The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is
affiliated with a law firm with which a lawyer-relative
of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge.
Under appropriate circumstances, the
fact that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"
under
Canon
3(C)(1),
or
that
the
lawyer-relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be "substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding" under Canon
3(C)(1)(d)(iii) may require his disqualification.
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An

annotation

in

50

A.L.R.2d

143,

"Relationship

to

attorney as disqualifying judge," deals, at page 158, with application of the rules to appellate judges:
It has been held frequently that where an attorney
is related to an appellate court member, and is merely
associated with the law firm appearing before the
appellate court, the appellate court judge is not
thereby disqualified in the absence of a showing that
the related attorney had a direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the litigation.
And under the provisions of the cited canon, the interest of the
relative must be "substantially affected."
II.
The

Raising of the Issue ^>f Judge
Disqualification Is Not Tirfiely

Billings's

A recent case of this court dealing with disqualification of judges, Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988), stressed that timeliness is
essential in filing a motion to disqualify.

Although that case

and many of the cases cited in it talk about raising the issue of
disqualification

at the earliest moment after knowledge of the

facts upon which the disqualification

is biased, we do not read

the cases as excluding the general view that the parties have an
obligation to make reasonable inquiry as to facts that might demonstrate a basis for some action, and in this case any kind of
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reasonable
the

inquiry would have

relationship

of

Judge

informed petitioner's

Billings

to

employees

of

counsel of
Fabian

&

Clendenin.
Even when a motion to disqualify is made promptly after
discovery of the facts, the needs of efficient judicial administration may require that a motion for disqualification be denied,
A case representing this point of view is Voltmann v. United Food
Co.. 147 F.2d 514f 517 (2 Cir.1945).

In that case the motion to

disqualify the trial judge was made as soon as the plaintiff's
attorney learned that a son-in-law of the judge was a member of
the firm trying the case.

The trial judge denied the motion to

disqualify which was made during the ninth day of trial.

With

respect to this matter, the Court of Appeals said:
* * * There was no intimation that his son-in-law had
anything to do with the case personally or even knew
that such an action had been brought.
He did, of
course, have an interest in the earnings of the firm of
which he was a member, but there was nothing to indicate that the fees of his firm were contingent or that
the outcome of this trial would make any difference to
him financially.
No doubt the judge would have
declined to sit in the case had he been aware at the
outset that there would be any objection to his sitting, and his refusal to sit in cases in which this
firm was interested would make assurance doubly sure
that no one would feel, however lacking in factual
basis the feeling might be, that he could not be imperfectly impartial.
*
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*

*

The judge was plainly empowered to decide whether
"in his opinion" it was such a connection with one of
the parties as would make it improper for him to sit.
The statute makes the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the judge a test in sucph circumstances, and
if his decision is not shown to have been arbitrary or
capricious, there is no abuse of discretion calling for
reversal.
We think that there was no abuse in this
instance. It was late in the trial and the matter was
presented for consideration, and though the plaintiffs
were in no way responsible for that fact, it was a circumstance
to be
considered
in fairness
to all
concerned.
It may be assumed that if the mattfer had been called to
Judge Billings's attention, she would have given mature consideration to the question of whether she should be disqualified or
not.

The respondents had nothing

to do with the question of

whether she should be disqualified, and

it would be unfair to

them to set aside the decision of the Coutt of Appeals on the
basis of what might be an "appearance" of

impartiality.

What

might

the beginning

of a

be a ground

for disqualification

at

case, in many instances will not be in the middle or at the end
of a case.
In any event, the disqualification

of Judge

Billings

would make no difference in the final outcome since the errors
committed by the trial judge were plain.
tiorari should be denied.

- 7 -

the petition for cer-

DATED this

;

^day

April 1990.

of

%ceERoe(S(gned;

Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
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